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CAN THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
STATUTE BE SAVED?
KATY J. HARRIGER*
I
INTRODUCTION
For the second time in its twenty-year history, the independent counsel pro1
visions of the Ethics in Government Act face an uncertain future. We are
closer than we have ever been to a bipartisan consensus that the statute should
be allowed to expire in June 1999. The reasons for the discontent are many and
suggest that underneath the surface there is less consensus than at first appears.
Some critics continue to maintain that the statute is an unconstitutional intru2
sion on presidential power, although the numbers making this argument have
dwindled significantly. Others claim that it is unfair and was never necessary
because the prior system of having the Attorney General appoint special inves3
tigators had worked in the past. Still others question whether the statute has
4
functioned in the way Congress intended.
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1. Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§Z591-599 (1994)). The statute contains a sunset clause that requires Congress to reauthorize it
every five years for it to remain in existence. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994). The statute expired in December 1992 because of controversy surrounding the Iran-Contra investigation. It was reauthorized in
1994 after the Whitewater scandal convinced some formerly resistant Republicans of the desirability of
independent investigation. See Holly Idelson, Law/Judiciary: Whitewater Boosts Prospects of Independent Counsel Bill, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 73 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Comment: The Independent
Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); Joseph diGenova, The Independent Counsel Act: A
Good Time to End a Bad Idea, 86 GEO. L.J. 2299 (1998). DiGenova calls the statute “extraconstitutional” and bases most of his argument on Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988), the case upholding the statute. See diGenova, supra, at 2305. He notes that, despite
the Court’s endorsement of the statute, Scalia’s dissent “became the siren song of Republicans who did
not like the application of the statute back then, and has now become the siren song of the Democrats
who do not like the application of the statute now.” Id. at 2299-2300.
3. See, e.g., Julie O’Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 463 (1996).
4. See, e.g., KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1992); John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney
General Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49
MERCER L. REV. 519 (1998); Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions:
How the Past Informs the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489 (1988) [hereinafter Harriger, History of Independent Counsel Provisions]; Katy J. Harriger, Damned If She Does and Damned If She
Doesn’t: The Attorney General and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2097 (1998).
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All of this dialogue, of course, is colored by the events of the last year. The
combination of the controversial Starr investigation and the allegations of campaign finance abuse by the Democrats in the 1996 election has so poisoned the
atmosphere that it seems doubtful that a thoughtful and bipartisan effort can be
made to remedy the flaws in the statute before it expires. In this article, I make
two arguments. The first is an argument that the statute in its current form
meets virtually none of the goals Congress intended in 1978. A careful weighing of the costs and benefits of the statute, based on our twenty-year experience
with it, suggests that it should be allowed to expire. The second argument is
that if, after a “cooling off” period that gives us some distance from the current
controversies, it is decided that we need an independent counsel mechanism of
some sort, then the statute should be substantially revised in an effort to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits.
II
THE GOALS OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE
In considering whether the independent counsel statute merits renewal, it is
important to look back at Congress’s intent in enacting the statute and ask
whether the goals have been met. In the largest sense, Congress’s goal was to
ensure public confidence in investigations of alleged wrongdoing by members
of the executive branch. More specifically, Congress sought to accomplish two
interrelated purposes with the statute. The first was to remove the presumed
conflict of interest that the Department of Justice has when it is called upon to
investigate fellow members of the executive branch, particularly when it is
called upon to investigate the President, Vice President, or Attorney General.
The second was to ensure that the person assigned to carry out this investiga5
tion was independent of control by the President or Attorney General. Thus,
removing the appearance of conflict of interest in these investigations and ensuring that an investigator would be perceived by the public as independent
each worked toward reassuring the public that allegations of this sort were being impartially investigated. The accumulation of these goals was often ex6
pressed as the desire to “remove politics” from the investigation of these cases.
In addition to its overarching goals, Congress had several secondary goals in
mind, some of which potentially were in conflict with the larger purposes of the
statute. Of great significance was the desire to ensure that the statute could
withstand constitutional scrutiny. In fact, much of the debate during the five
years that Congress considered the proposed statute centered on constitutional
questions about whether law enforcement power could be removed from con-

5. For a more extensive exploration of the legislative history of the statute, see HARRIGER, supra
note 4, at 13-91.
6. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1974).
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trol by the executive branch. Congress faced a serious dilemma: If it wanted
to solve the problems of conflict of interest and appearance of independence, it
had to remove or at least limit executive control; the amount of debate and resistance to the notion on constitutional grounds, however, made it very difficult
to remove that control completely. There also were secondary concerns about
fairness to the targets of investigations and about an “out of control” prosecu8
tor, that worked against creating a truly independent investigator.
In the statute ultimately adopted, Congress compromised on the independence issue. It placed the “triggering” mechanism in the hands of the Attorney
General. Initial allegations were to be screened by the Attorney General in a
preliminary investigation that would weed out baseless charges and acknowl9
edge the traditional role of executive control over law enforcement. The Attorney General also was given the authority to remove an independent counsel,
10
subject to review by a federal district court. But the actual appointment of an
independent counsel was to rest with a special court panel made up of senior
11
judges from the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and it was to this panel that the inde12
pendent counsel would report at the conclusion of his or her investigation.
III
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STATUTE
Has the independent counsel statute lived up to expectations? Does it adequately address the problems Congress sought to solve? Or rather, as its critics
contend, has it created its own set of problems that outweigh any benefits to be
gained from its existence? A review of our two decades of experience with the
statute suggests that little of what Congress hoped to accomplish has occurred.
The only goal that has been met convincingly is the desire to create a constitu13
tional statute. This of course is laudable, and ought not to be dismissed as insignificant. But constitutional policy and good policy are not necessarily the
same thing, and a constitutional policy that is for all practical purposes ineffective should not be defended.

7. See, e.g., id. at 83-90 (statement of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Department of Justice); Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 179-85 (1973) (testimony of Robert Taft, Jr., Senator from Ohio); Howard H.
Baker, Jr., The Proposed Judicially Appointed Independent Office of Public Attorney: Some Constitutional Objections and an Alternative, 29 SW. L.J. 671 (1975); Karen H. Schneider et al., The Special
Prosecutor in the Federal System: A Proposal, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 577 (1973); Note, Removing Politics from the Justice Department: Constitutional Problems with Institutional Reform, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV.
366 (1975).
8. See Harriger, History of Independent Counsel Provisions, supra note 4, at 498-502 (discussing
Congress’s attempt to weigh the competing values of independence and accountability).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a) (1994).
10. See id. § 596(a).
11. See id. § 49.
12. See id. § 594(h)(1)(A).
13. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute as constitutional in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988).
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A. Eliminating Conflict of Interest
For constitutional reasons, Congress left the ability to trigger the appointment of an independent counsel in the hands of the Attorney General. That
statutory power has become a source of controversy as Attorneys General have
been criticized both for their refusal to request the appointment of independent
counsels and for their decisions to make such requests.
During the Reagan Administration, both William French Smith and Edwin
Meese were criticized for reading their discretion under the statute too broadly.
On three separate occasions, private parties seeking to force him to trigger independent counsel investigations sued Smith. None of these suits was successful; appellate courts determined that Congress intended no private right of action to compel the Attorney General to request an appointment. Instead, the
courts found the triggering decision to be unreviewable, based as it was on the
14
Attorney General’s legitimate discretion in law enforcement matters.
Meese also was subject to considerable criticism for his interpretation of the
statute. In its 1987 review of the statute, the oversight subcommittee of the
Senate Government Affairs committee concluded that Meese had abused his
discretion under the statute, particularly by failing to seek appointments of independent counsels in several cases where the subcommittee believed ap15
pointments had been warranted. As a consequence, Congress amended the
statute in 1987 to restrict the factors that an Attorney General can consider in
16
conducting a preliminary investigation.
Perhaps no Attorney General has come under more criticism for her interpretation of the statute than has Janet Reno. Prior to the campaign finance
controversy, she was criticized for viewing her discretion as too limited and for
17
requesting independent counsels too quickly. Since the advent of the campaign finance imbroglio and her later decisions not to seek independent counsel
18
appointments, she has encountered the opposite criticism.
At the very least, the current arrangement has not resolved the issue of
when the perception of a conflict of interest actually exists. The decision to
place the triggering mechanism in the hands of the Attorney General helped
Congress accomplish the goals of writing a constitutional statute and ensuring
that not all allegations against covered officials would be subjected to the extraordinary measure of an independent counsel. On the other hand, it did not
resolve the problem of the lack of confidence in the Attorney General’s impartiality in investigating these cases or in making judgments about their serious14. See Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986); Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc) (per curiam); Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
15. See S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 7-13 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2156-62.
16. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, § 2, 101 Stat. 1293
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 591(d)(1)-(2), § 591(e), § 592 (a)(1) & (2)(B) (1994)).
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey Goldberg, What Is Janet Reno Thinking?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1997, at §Z6, 16;
Anthony Lewis, Reductio Ad Absurdum, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23.
18. See Neil A. Lewis, The Attorney General’s Decision: The Reaction; Republicans React Quickly
and Angrily to Reno Move, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at A31.
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ness. The Attorney General remains the critical gatekeeper in the system; the
criticism simply has moved to an earlier stage of the process. The only remedy
is an automatic trigger, but no one is willing to accept the inevitable consequence of such a move: the further proliferation of independent counsels.
B. Creating an Independent Investigator
It is certainly true that Congress was successful in creating an investigative
apparatus that is largely free from control by the executive branch. The irony
of this “success” is that now one of the popular criticisms of the arrangement is
that the independent counsel is accountable to no one. The flaw in the criticism, of course, is that by definition, control must be sacrificed in order to
achieve independence. We cannot have it both ways: An accountable independent prosecutor is a contradiction in terms.
Beyond the rhetoric, however, a quite different problem exists. This problem is not a prosecutor who is too independent, but instead a prosecutor too
constrained by other institutional actors in the system. In most cases, constraint is a good thing, because in our system of separated powers it is virtually
19
impossible for an actor to exercise unchecked power. There are times, however, when this system of institutional constraints seriously interferes with the
ability of an independent counsel to carry out a successful investigation.
Perhaps the two best examples of this problem are the two most prominent
cases that have arisen under the act: Iran-Contra and Whitewater. In the IranContra investigation, Lawrence Walsh was hampered by Congress’s parallel investigation and its decision to grant immunity to Oliver North and John Poin20
dexter, the Attorney General’s continued control over access to classified
21
documents needed to successfully prosecute key parts of the case, judicial de22
cisions that overturned his successful prosecutions, and the President’s consti23
tutional authority to pardon those caught up in the case. The Whitewater investigation was hampered by simultaneous congressional investigations and, in
the Lewinsky matter, by the President’s claims of executive privilege, Secret
Service privilege, and attorney-client privilege. While more often than not the
24
courts have ultimately sided with Starr on the legal questions, these battles

19. See Katy J. Harriger, Separation of Powers and the Politics of Independent Counsels, 109 POL.
SCI. Q. 261 (Summer 1994).
20. See LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP 8595 (1997).
21. See Barrett, supra note 4, at 535-37.
22. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. North, 920
F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
23. See Carroll J. Doherty, Iran Contra: Walsh Says Pardon Thwarted New Evidence on Arms
Deals, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 325 (1993).
24. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d. 1100 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Office of
the President v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d
1073 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
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have been costly to the investigation, both in dollars and time. The delays are
significant because it is the time and money associated with independent counsel investigations that seems to most trouble the public.
Finally, both of these investigations were subject to attacks from the White
House and Congress that ultimately undermined the credibility of the investigations with the public. This loss of credibility is an important and overlooked
“cost” of independence. When the executive branch is responsible for the appointment, it is far more difficult politically to attack a special prosecutor; to do
so bears serious consequences, as Richard Nixon discovered. With independent appointment, by contrast, it was possible for President George Bush and
Senator Bob Dole, for example, to attack Walsh as being motivated by parti25
sanship, despite the fact that he had extensive Republican credentials. Similarly, there was no political cost to President Clinton—and, as it turned out,
much to be gained—in attacking Starr for his alleged partisanship, and it was
even easier to make such attacks stick because the special court appointed an
26
independent counsel clearly aligned with the Republican party.
The results on the goal of independence are a mixed bag. Congress has succeeded in limiting direct executive control of the independent counsel. But behind the façade of independence, however, lurks a far more complex reality in
which interdependent special prosecutors are constrained, for both good and
ill, by the actions of other political actors in the system.
C. Promoting Public Confidence
Before the Iran-Contra investigation, it could have been argued that the independent counsel statute had achieved the goal of reassuring the public that
criminal allegations against public officials were being investigated impartially.
It is probable that the broader public generally was unaware of the relatively
obscure cases that arose under the statute prior to Iran-Contra. The attentive
public, media, and government officials of the opposite party were reassured,
however, at least when measured by their willingness to accept the outcomes of
27
those cases without controversy.
After Iran-Contra, the situation has
changed.
Lawrence Walsh, the Independent Counsel for Iran-Contra, was the target
of escalating criticism as his investigation proceeded. Two related events in
particular were used to challenge his credibility with the public: the decision to
re-indict Caspar Weinberger just before the 1992 presidential election and the
revelation in that indictment that George Bush was more involved in decisionmaking than he had admitted. These preelection events actually led to calls for

25. See WALSH, supra note 20, at 413-89.
26. For discussion of the controversy over Starr’s appointment, see David Johnston, Appointment
in Whitewater Turns into a Partisan Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1994, at A1; David Johnston, Three
Judges Spurn Protest on Whitewater Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at A16.
27. See HARRIGER, supra note 4, at 168-98.
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an independent counsel to investigate the Independent Counsel. The late indictment of Weinberger was portrayed as evidence of the dangerous consequences of allowing a prosecutor unlimited time and money to conduct an in29
vestigation. The undermining of Walsh’s credibility by his critics made it
possible for congressional foes to keep the independent counsel statute from
being reauthorized and for lame duck President Bush to pardon most of the
30
targets of the investigation with very little public outcry.
While the facts underlying the Iran-Contra and Whitewater cases are quite
different, they share the distinction of being the only two cases under the statute in which the President was implicated in wrongdoing. As such, they understandably garnered far more media attention than other cases involving independent counsels. Challenges to Ken Starr’s legitimacy began sooner than they
did for Walsh and continued intermittently throughout his investigation, skyrocketing in 1998 after the onset of the Lewinsky matter. The Starr investigation had two principal results. First, the broader public finally achieved awareness of the existence of independent counsels. Second, contrary to Congress’s
goal of public reassurance, the public acquired very negative perceptions of
31
both Starr and the statute under which he operated. While prosecution is
never a popularity contest, this negative public image is extremely important
for an independent counsel. If one’s primary statutory purpose is to reassure
the public that impartial investigation is taking place free from executive control, and the public does not believe that this is in fact what is happening, then
the final conclusions of such investigations will not obtain public acceptance.
This is most problematic in cases involving the President, where any punishment for wrongdoing is likely to involve political decisionmakers responsible to
the public.
Finally, the proliferation of independent counsel investigations and of calls
for such investigations actually has further undermined, rather than promoted,
confidence in government. Suzanne Garment argues that the independent
counsel process has become part of the “scandal system” that has contributed
32
to a “culture of mistrust” in American politics. Referring to the widespread
press coverage of independent counsel issues in 1997, Norman Ornstein wrote:
To an alien, unschooled in American politics and government, who views this year’s
press coverage as representative of America’s process and policy focus, it might seem
that every major policy figure in Washington spent most of her time calling for more
independent counsels, resisting the appointment of independent counsels, raging
against existing independent counsels, or investigating allegations of impropriety and
lawbreaking as independent counsels. It would be easy for this alien, relying on press
28. See Dole Urges Inquiry About Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at A13.
29. See Robert Bork, Against the Independent Counsel, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1993, at 21, 25-26.
30. See WALSH, supra note 20, at 504-05.
31. See, e.g., Dan Balz & Claudia Deane, Hit the Road, Jack: People Wish Kenneth Starr Would Go
Away, but They Are Divided About Bill Clinton, WASH. POST NAT’L WKLY. ED., Apr. 13, 1998, at 35;
Jeffrey Toobin, Starr Can’t Help It, NEW YORKER, May 18, 1998, at 32 (noting that a NBC News/Wall
Street Journal poll showed only an 18% approval rating for Starr).
32. SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL: THE CULTURE OF MISTRUST IN AMERICAN POLITICS 83-108
(1991).
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accounts, to believe that Washington is a nest of corruption—worse than at any time
in modern memory—and filled with officials who cannot be trusted to investigate others inside the government.33

While the current distrust in government cannot be laid at the feet of the
independent counsel statute alone, it does seem clear that in the current political climate there is little reason to believe that it has met the goal of public reassurance intended by Congress. In fact, Cass Sunstein argues quite convincingly that the statute creates perverse incentives that invite “scandal
mongering” and “the transformation of political disputes into criminal allega34
tions.” There may have been a time when an independent counsel could operate out of the limelight and free of the public attention and attacks that have
become part of our recent past. With Iran-Contra, however, that innocence
was lost. “Politics today demand that doubt be cast on the independence,
judgment or ability of an Independent Counsel where the actions of that Independent Counsel may interfere with partisan interests,” argues Julie
O’Sullivan, so “[t]he object—and predictable consequence—is to undermine
what the statute seeks to promote: public confidence in the integrity of the re35
sults of an Independent Counsel’s investigation in politically sensitive cases.”
D. Ensuring Constitutionality
During the first decade of the statute, most of the debate about it centered
on the question of its constitutionality. Despite Congress’s concerted effort to
construct an arrangement that could withstand constitutional challenge, there
remained critics who insisted that the statute violated the separation of powers.
Even though he signed the statute’s reauthorization twice, in 1982 and 1987,
36
Ronald Reagan continued to reject its constitutionality. In Morrison v. Ol37
son, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute, with Justice Scalia as the lone
dissenter. This decisive decision put to rest most challenges to the Act’s constitutionality, confirming Congress’s belief that placing the triggering mechanism
and the power of removal in the hands of the Attorney General would allow
adequate control by the executive branch to pass constitutional muster.
The often overlooked consequence of the Morrison decision is that it leaves
very little room for changing the statute, except in the direction of further executive control. The opinion emphasized the importance of the Attorney General’s role and the temporary and limited nature of the independent counsel’s
38
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it warned against any aggrandizement of judicial
power by the special court, cautioning the panel against any action that could

33. Norman J. Ornstein, Doing Congress’s Dirty Work, 86 GEO. L.J. 2179, 2179 (1998).
34. Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2268 (1998).
35. O’Sullivan, supra note 3, at 471.
36. See Mark Willen, A Constitutional Challenge: Balky Reagan Signs Extension of IndependentCounsel Law, 45 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3166 (1987); President’s Statement on Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1987, 23 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1526 (Dec. 15, 1987).
37. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
38. See id. at 685-96 (discussing separation of powers concerns).
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be interpreted as going beyond the limited administrative duties granted to it
39
under the statute. Consequently, unless Congress wants to reopen the question of constitutionality—the one goal it has met convincingly with the current
statute—it should not entertain ideas for reform that further restrict or remove
the Attorney General or that expand the supervisory authority of the special
court.
E. Ensuring Fairness to the Target
In 1978, concerns about the statute’s fairness to the targets of investigations
were addressed in several ways, centering on the desirability of avoiding the
premature airing of charges against covered officials. First, the power to conduct the preliminary investigation was placed in the hands of the Attorney
40
General so that frivolous and unsupported allegations could be screened out.
The statute also allowed for the possibility that the Attorney General’s report
to the special court, the appointment of an independent counsel, and the final
report of the independent counsel could be kept secret. The special court was
given the authority to decide whether to make any of these documents or deci41
sions public.
The first two cases under the statute, the investigations of Carter Administration staffers Hamilton Jordan and Timothy Kraft for alleged social cocaine
use, renewed concerns about the statute’s fairness. Both cases led to grand jury
investigations, despite the fact that neither would have prompted such an investigation by the Department of Justice had similar minor allegations been made
against a regular citizen or a noncovered official. In the 1983 reauthorization of
the statute, Congress provided for the award of attorneys’ fees to targets who
42
were not indicted at the conclusion of an independent counsel investigation.
In addition, Congress gave the Attorney General new discretion to consider the
43
credibility of sources alleging misconduct by covered officials and encouraged
the independent counsel to follow the prosecutorial guidelines and policies of
44
the Department of Justice “except where not possible.”
There have been allegations against covered officials that have been effectively screened out prior to public exposure, and there have been independent
45
counsels appointed without public announcement. But most cases have been
made public, as have the final reports of most independent counsels. Even before the notorious Starr Report, there was concern that the reporting requirement further exposed targets to unfair publicity. The damage done in these in39. See id. at 677-84.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 592 (1994).
41. See id. §§ 592-594.
42. See id. § 593(f).
43. See id. § 592(a).
44. See id. § 594(f).
45. For a discussion of the Attorney General’s discretion in screening cases, see H ARRIGER, supra
note 4, at 123-27. For a list of cases revealing two appointments (in 1989 and 1991) that remain confidential, see Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2284-85.
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vestigations has affected both reputations and pocketbooks. Targets and others
caught up in the investigations have incurred significant costs for legal repre46
sentation. The reimbursement provisions actually have led some people involved in these investigations to ask to be called targets in order to have some
47
chance of recouping their legal expenses.
Questions of fairness also have been raised about the lack of time and
budget restrictions on independent counsels. With a single case, an open
checkbook, and no time limit, independent counsels can leave no stone unturned when investigating a covered official. O’Sullivan argues that rather than
providing “better justice” for covered officials, the statute creates a situation of
unfairness, giving the independent counsel “an excess of time, means and incentive to pursue a far greater number of people, over a wider investigatory
landscape, with less justification, and at greater human, financial and institutional cost than is reasonably necessary to promote the reality, or appearance,
48
of evenhanded justice.” It is important to note that not all independent counsels in the last twenty years have taken advantage of these opportunities. But
as Cass Sunstein notes, by giving independent counsels a single case in the public spotlight and no financial or time limit on his or her ability to pursue it, the
statute
eliminates some of the key safeguards built into the ordinary role of the prosecutor. . . . An independent counsel who uncovers nothing is likely to look as if he has
more or less wasted his time, or done nothing, whereas an independent counsel who
brings a prosecution . . . is likely to look, in at least some circles, like another Archibald Cox, a kind of hero of democratic ideals.49

There seems no way around this problem that would not substantially interfere with other goals of the Act. Too much supervision by either the Attorney
General or the special court would run afoul of the goals of independence or
constitutionality. Placing artificial time and budget restrictions on the independent counsel in order to force the same kind of resource decisions that
regular prosecutors make would only provide incentives for targets with something to hide to practice delaying tactics. As long as the independent counsel
statute remains in its current formulation, these problems will persist: They are
the inevitable consequence of choosing to emphasize the goal of independence
over the desire for accountability.
F. The Case for Expiration of the Statute
Given the limited success of the independent counsel statute in meeting the
goals established for it by Congress, it is difficult to defend another reauthori-

46. See Kathleen Clark, Paying the Price for Heightened Ethics Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and
Other Ways That Government Officials Pay Their Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 65 (1997).
47. See Interview with Michael Zeldin, Independent Counsel in Clinton passport files case, Washington, D.C. (June 29, 1998); Interview with Joseph diGenova, Independent Counsel in Clinton passport files case, Washington, D.C. (June 24, 1998).
48. O’Sullivan, supra note 3, at 475.
49. Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2279.

HARRIGER.FMT

06/07/99 12:05 PM

Page 131: Winter 1999]

CAN THIS STATUTE BE SAVED?

141

zation. Twenty-five years have passed since the Saturday Night Massacre,
when Archibald Cox was fired and public outcry led to Congress’s efforts to
find a solution to the executive control of special prosecutors. Twenty years
have passed since the passage of the independent counsel provisions. We have
sufficient distance from the trauma of Watergate and sufficient experience with
the independent counsel statute to know that there is no silver bullet that can
solve the problems highlighted by that scandal. In fact, the solution has neither
solved the problem of politicized justice nor reassured the public that such a
goal is possible.
We find ourselves, on the eve of the next reauthorization, in a political climate so divided and embittered by scandal politics that it is difficult to imagine
a serious, deliberative, and bipartisan effort to think carefully about the costs
and benefits of statutory independent counsels. Tinkering with the statute as
Congress did in its previous reauthorizations will not adequately remedy its
flaws. The very concept of an independent counsel must be reconsidered, with
the memory of Watergate as only one piece of the evidence we use for that reassessment. We must include as well what we know from our recent experience
with post-Watergate reform and our past experience with two centuries of ad
hoc appointments of special prosecutors. These experiences suggest that when
we need special prosecutors we will get them, and that for most of the cases
now covered under the statute, the Department of Justice is capable and
50
equipped to provide a “better justice” than is an independent counsel.
IV
REFORMING THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE
The independent counsel statute has become a tool by which media and
partisan elites jockey for position in the power politics inside the Beltway. Now
that both sides of the partisan debate have been hurt by its use, there is far less
enthusiasm for it than there was in the past. On the other hand, the experience
between 1992, when the statute was allowed to expire, and 1994, when it was reauthorized and then used to appoint Ken Starr to the Whitewater investigation,
suggests that neither side is prepared to abandon the notion altogether for very
long. Should a movement arise for the maintenance of some kind of statutory
mechanism for independent investigation, there are reforms that would make
such an arrangement a better one.
A. Return Appointment Power to the Executive
The twenty-year experiment with judicial appointment has produced mixed
results for both removing conflicts of interest and promoting the appearance of
impartiality. As long as the triggering mechanism remains in the hands of the
Attorney General, the problem of the appearance of conflict has not been resolved. More recently, the independence of the special court itself and the im50. HARRIGER, supra note 4, at 200; O’Sullivan, supra note 3, at 475.
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partiality of independent counsels have been called into question, politicizing
51
the very process designed to “remove politics” from these cases. Given these
two realities, it would be both more honest and more practical to return appointment power to the Attorney General.
The most significant advantage to executive appointment of the independent counsel is the enhancement of accountability. Twenty-five years after the
firing of Archibald Cox, there is as much concern about the abuse of power by
the independent counsel as there is about the abuse of power by the President.
Some of that concern has been based on real issues about how recent prosecutors have used their power, but much of it is manufactured by partisan supporters of the targets. Appointment by the executive branch would hold the independent counsel accountable, but also would make the executive accountable
for the actions of the independent counsel. An administration would be hardpressed to accuse its own investigator of engaging in partisan “witch hunts” or
“vast right-wing conspiracies.” Conversely, the public and media and partisan
opponents would force the Attorney General to make an appointment in which
they had confidence.
B. Limit the Coverage of the Act
Far fewer executive branch officials should be automatically covered by the
statute. Most of the cases that have been investigated by independent counsels
could have been handled by the Department of Justice without a conflict of interest. The only officials for which there should be serious consideration of
mandatory coverage are the President, Vice-President, and Attorney General.
All other potential cases for independent investigation should fall under a
catch-all category that requires the finding of an actual conflict of interest by
the Attorney General or the Department of Justice before an independent investigation is triggered.
C. Raise the Standard for Triggering Appointment
Currently, the Attorney General is required to request the appointment of
an independent counsel if she cannot conclude within ninety days that “no fur52
ther investigation or prosecution is warranted.” This standard is too low, particularly the “no further investigation” provision. It is a rare case that requires
no further investigation, especially when the Department of Justice cannot use
53
subpoenas or grand juries and must rely on the voluntary cooperation of all
witnesses. The Attorney General’s discretion should be expanded at least
enough to allow more time to investigate using the tools that would make such
an investigation effective. When she uncovers “evidence of criminal wrongdo-

51. See O’Sullivan, supra note 3, at 470-75.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b) (1994). She may apply to the court panel for one 60-day extension. See id.
§ 592 (a)(3) (1994).
53. See id. § 592(a)(2).
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ing that merits the empanelling of a grand jury for further investigation,” she
should appoint a special prosecutor to pursue that investigation.
D. Remove the Role of Congressional Committees
The statute currently allows a majority of the members of either party on
the Judiciary Committee of either chamber of Congress to write to the Attorney General requesting the appointment of an independent counsel. The Attorney General is not required to comply but is required to respond in writing
54
to that request. Structured along party lines, this provision is an invitation to
partisan abuse of the independent counsel process. Removing this incentive to
call for independent counsels would not remove the existing right of Members
of Congress to publicly encourage the Attorney General to make such an appointment. It would, however, remove the coercion implicit in the current provisions and help reduce the partisan climate within which these cases occur.
E. Remove or Clarify the Impeachment Referral Clause of the Statute
The controversy over the Starr Report and the Independent Counsel’s subsequent testimony before the House Judiciary Committee has drawn attention
to the impeachment referral clause of the statute for the first time. Congress
included this provision to create a process similar to that which took place in
Watergate. The House Judiciary Committee and the Watergate Special Prosecution Force conducted simultaneous investigations. There was some exchange
of information between the two investigations, and Leon Jaworski shared a
“road-map” of evidence with the Committee that helped shape the impeach55
ment counts against President Nixon. Such activities, however, are quite different from the relationship between Ken Starr and the House Judiciary Committee in the Lewinsky matter. The clause was not intended to make the
independent counsel an official impeachment investigator, nor did it authorize
him to be the chief witness in favor of impeachment in congressional proceed56
ings.
Congress should simply remove this clause from the statute. While well intended in principle, it suffers from flaws of both a constitutional and interpretational nature. Constitutionally, it invites Congress to avoid its own responsibility for carrying out careful and deliberate investigations of potentially
57
impeachable offenses. As a matter of interpretation, the clause is so vague
that it invites the kind of misreading made by Starr of his authority under the
clause. If left in the statute, the impeachment referral clause should be clarified
to make clear that it permits only the passing on of allegations, not the actual
assertion of the factual and legal arguments for or against impeachment.
54. See id. § 592(g).
55. HARRIGER, supra note 4, at 28-29.
56. See generally Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent
Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193 (1998).
57. See id.
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V
CONCLUSION
The independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act were
a well-intentioned effort to respond to the problems of governance revealed in
the Watergate scandal, particularly, the Saturday Night Massacre. Twenty
years and twenty investigations later, it is time to ask whether the experiment
merits continuation. While much of the criticism of the independent counsel
statute has been exaggerated and driven by partisan motives rather than policy
evidence, there is real doubt whether the statute is an effective means for addressing the problem of politicized investigations of executive branch officials.
Before reauthorizing the statute in 1999, Congress should consider seriously the
possibility that most cases do not warrant resort to this extraordinary measure
and that most cases can be handled by the Department of Justice. In the few
cases meriting special, independent investigation, the Attorney General should
be authorized to make the appointment of a special investigator and then be
held accountable for the quality of that appointment. Congress may formalize
this procedure by statute or, by failing to act, simply return to the system of ad
hoc appointment used prior to 1978 and from 1992 to 1994. With either result,
the outcome would be no more politicized a process than that which the current
statute has spawned.

